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ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates that vertically aligned private or public organizations 
are capable of generating strategic trade advantage similar to that acquired through 
direct government export subsidization. The model considers two forms of vertical 
coordination that lead to advantageous trade positions in international markets: up- 
stream vertical restraint and downstream equity sharing. Such practices are com- 
monly employed both by state trading agencies and by private firms in nations with 
lenient antitrust laws. The finding has important implications under new World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules intended to reduce government intervention in in- 
ternational transactions. Recent reforms in the WTO favor nations that sanction 
highly refined vertical linkages between firms, while nations with stringent antitrust 
legislation have an incentive to negotiate for greater harmonization of international 
laws. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
GJLOBALLY traded goods are often produced in vertically structured eco- 
nomic sectors in which a final product is developed through a series of 
transactions between upstream suppliers of inputs and downstream produc- 
ers, intermediaries, and retailers. In many nations, vertical transactions in a 
chain of production are arranged through highly coordinated linkages be- 
tween firms. The celebrated Japanese keiretsu and the less familiar Korean 
chaebols are examples of industrial structures that involve linked equity in- 
terests of vertically aligned corporations.1 The success of such vertically co- 
* The authors would like to thank James Brander, Yang-Ming Chang, Kala Krishna, Jef- 
frey Perloff, Roger McEowen, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
' The cross-shareholding feature between vertical stages of keiretsu organizations has been 
associated with improved product quality, relaxed financial restrictions on new plant invest- 
ment, greater market penetration, increased incidences of dumping, and reductions in new 
firm entry and survival. For cross shareholding and product quality, see David Flath, Vertical 
Integration by Means of Shareholding Interlocks, 7 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 369 (1989). For evi- 
dence of relaxed financial restrictions, see Rene Belderdos & Leo Sleuwaegen, Japanese 
Firms and the Decision to Invest Abroad: Business Groups and Regional Core Networks, 78 
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 214 (1996). For market penetration and dumping, see Leonard K. 
Cheng & Mordechai E. Kreinin, Supplier Preferences and Dumping: An Analysis of Japanese 
Corporate Groups, 63 S. Econ. J. 51 (1996). For an analysis of de novo firm entry and sur- 
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ordinated industry structures is widely recognized in international markets.2 
Another common form of vertical coordination is arranged through govern- 
ment marketing boards, which directly control the internal transfer price be- 
tween upstream producers and downstream retailing agents. Examples in- 
clude the single-desk selling systems of state trading enterprises uch as the 
Canadian and Australian Wheat Boards, which typically purchase grain at 
below-market prices, then reimburse commodity producers with a share of 
profits in the downstream international markets. This paper examines the 
strategic trade implications of these and other vertically coordinated indus- 
try structures. 
The model demonstrates that nations with lenient antitrust standards have 
a strategic trade advantage in international markets. This result is not driven 
by returns to scale or by differences in productive efficiency; rather, it is 
built solely on the benefits derived by downstream firms that employ back- 
ward linkages as precommitment mechanisms.3 However, unlike the out- 
come of a government subsidization program, in which the noncooperative 
Nash equilibrium is characterized by multilateral export promotion and a 
reduction in the welfare of producing nations, unilateral precommitment 
outcomes occur when legal restrictions within a rival nation prohibit private 
mechanisms for vertical control. The implications of the model are thus im- 
portant both in the formation of antitrust policy and in the negotiation of 
free-trade agreements. If international restrictions are imposed to reduce 
government promotion of exports, as currently sanctioned by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), unilateral precommitment strategies are still 
possible up to the limits imposed by national (and international) antitrust 
laws. 
vival, see David D. Li & Shan Li, A Theory of Corporate Scope and Financial Structure, 51 
J. Fin. 691 (1996). 
2 See, for example, Vincent Cable, The New Trade Agenda: Universal Rules amid Cul- 
tural Diversity, 72 Int'l Affairs 227 (1996); and David Flath, The Keiretsu Puzzle, 10 J. Japa- 
nese & Int'l Econ. 101 (1996). 
3 In this regard, our model is related to strategic trade models that examine the profit- 
shifting effect of government precommitment for export promotion. See, for example, James 
A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, 
18 J. Int'l Econ. 83 (1985); Giovanni Maggi, Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode 
of Competition, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 237 (1996); and Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The 
Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Oligopolistic Industries, 36 J. Int'l 
Econ. 133 (1994). The implications of vertical arrangements for strategic trade policy have 
been examined by Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. Jones, Vertical Foreclosure and Interna- 
tional Trade Policy, 58 Rev. Econ. Stud. 153 (1991); and Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. 
Jones, Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets, 32 J. Int'l Econ. 31 (1992). These 
latter studies, which analyze importer and exporter policies when an upstream firm supplies 
inputs to a domestic and/or a foreign final goods producer, consider the role of government 
as an arbiter in international transactions, and they do not examine the effect of legal and 
institutional structure on trade outcomes. 
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Existing analyses in the international trade literature typically presume 
that only governments are capable of generating precommitment mecha- 
nisms to capture strategic trade benefits. To the best of our knowledge, 
there has been no analysis of strategic trade incentives in the context of 
private precommitment mechanisms. The omission is rather surprising 
given that these methods are well defined in firm-level principal-agent mod- 
els.4 These papers focus on the case in which strategic precommitment is 
accomplished through delegation within a single institution. Our paper de- 
viates from this framework to consider the case of arm's-length transaction 
in which the agent signing the contract remains a separate corporate entity. 
The formal structure is thus similar to that examined in the vertical separa- 
tion literature, though unique connections are made here between vertical 
structure, antitrust law, and international trade.5 In particular, the present 
analysis considers the case in which exchange that occurs between firms is 
subject to review by a national antitrust authority, and, consequently, highly 
refined vertical linkages may be allowed in some nations while prohibited 
in others.6 
Current antitrust standards vary widely across nations. In the United 
States and in most European Union (E.U.) nations, for example, legislation 
governing vertically coordinated transactions (hereafter, vertical antitrust 
law) limits the formation of vertical arrangements uch as keiretsu and 
chaebols and encumbers the development of government-sanctioned export 
marketing boards. The E.U. has recently worked toward harmonization in 
a system of minimal merger control regulations and intends to expand 
harmonization principles to Central European, east European, and Medi- 
terranean nations. However, many other countries, particularly those in 
developing regions, still lack a sophisticated legal system governing anti- 
competitive behavior.7 Indeed, as Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann notes, the cur- 
4 See, for example, John Vickers, Delegation and the Theory of the Firm, 95 Econ. J. 138 
(1985); Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd, Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly, 77 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 927 (1987); Steven D. Sklivas, The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives, 
18 RAND J. Econ. 452 (1987); and David Reitman, Stock Options and the Strategic Use of 
Managerial Incentives, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 513 (1993). 5 For greater detail on the potential effects of vertical separation, see Y. Joseph Lin, Oli- 
gopoly and Vertical Integration: Note, 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 251 (1988); Giacomo Bonanno & 
John Vickers, Vertical Separation, 36 J. Indus. Econ. 257 (1988); Anne T. Coughlin & Birger 
Wernerfelt, On Credible Delegation by Oligopolists: A Discussion of Distribution Channel 
Management, 35 Mgmt. Sci. 226 (1989); and Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically 
Related Duopolies, 28 RAND J. Econ. 37 (1997). 
6 Direct integration may be possible in some cases, although a proposed merger between 
upstream and downstream producers is also likely to involve antitrust scrutiny. 7 The movement toward international harmonization of antitrust law is still in its infancy. 
In 1993, a draft of the international antitrust code (DIAC), which outlines various per se laws 
and rules of reason on horizontal and vertical restraints, was provided to the WTO. See 
146 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
rent degree of antitrust cooperation among nations is "widely regarded as 
inadequate," and the possibility of an emerging worldwide competition au- 
thority "is not a politically realistic short or medium-term option."8 
The body of antitrust law that governs vertical transactions may play an 
important role in determining the source of comparative advantage along a 
production chain. Specifically, trade distortions may emerge through asym- 
metric antitrust legislation as nations that allow highly refined vertical link- 
ages gain comparative advantage in the production of finished goods while 
nations with stringent antitrust laws acquire comparative advantage in the 
production of raw materials. Given the fact that downstream industries are 
typically high-value-added stages of production, the source of comparative 
advantage in vertically structured sectors is of particular policy concern. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents 
a theoretical model of international trade in a vertically structured sector 
composed of a competitive upstream raw material industry and an oligopo- 
listic downstream final goods market. Section III presents our analysis re- 
garding two primary forms of vertical control: upstream vertical restraint 
and downstream equity sharing. Section IV discusses implications for pol- 
icy analysis, and Section V concludes. 
II. THE FORMAL MODEL 
The model considers a vertically structured sector composed of a com- 
petitive upstream raw-material industry and an imperfectly competitive 
downstream producer of a final good. The raw-material industry in each 
country produces a homogeneous input at constant marginal cost, c, which 
is sold to a single downstream firm and costlessly transformed via a Leon- 
tief technology into homogeneous output of a final good.9 The final good is 
then sold in an international market, composed of a domestic and a foreign 
firm, which are labeled firms 1 and 2, respectively. 
United Nations, The Role of Competition Policy in Economic Reforms in Developing or 
Other Countries (1993). Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Gov- 
ernments and for Private Business: A Trade Law Approach for Linking Trade and Competi- 
tion Rules in the WTO, in Public Policy and Global Technological Integration (Frederick M. 
Abbott & David J. Gerber eds. 1997), provides an excellent summary of existing interna- 
tional antitrust law in the WTO. 
8 Petersmann, supra note 7, at 243-44. 
9 These restrictions are imposed purely for expositional convenience. With constant mar- 
ginal cost in the upstream industry, the strategic motive to form contracts is isolated from 
the incentive of downstream firms to develop backward relations to reduce efficiency loss. 
For an analysis of such incentives, see Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: The Monopsony 
Case, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 561 (1978). With Leontief technology in the downstream industry, 
the model abstracts from issues of input substitutability. Extension of the model to consider 
more general relationships in either direction would be relatively straightforward. 
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Strategic interaction between the firms is modeled as a three-stage game, 
the timing of which is described as follows. In the first stage, the contract 
stage, the domestic downstream firm writes an observable and nonrenego- 
tiable contract with one or more of its input suppliers. The contract specifies 
the wholesale price of the input w, the upstream firms share of downstream 
profits oa, and/or a fixed transfer F. In the second stage, the acceptance 
stage, the upstream supplier either accepts or rejects the contract. If the con- 
tract is rejected, then the domestic firm purchases the input on the spot mar- 
ket at marginal cost c. In the third and final stage, the output stage, the 
domestic and foreign firms compete in an international Cournot-Nash 
oligopoly. 
Such a sequence of events accords well with the contract design of mar- 
keting agents in State Trading Enterprises. For example, prior to harvest 
each year, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) announces initial procure- 
ment prices for Canadian grains, which are typically set at 75-80 percent 
of the forecasted international prices. At the end of the marketing season, 
final payments are made to producers based on proceeds from international 
sales. Such procurement contracts are legally binding in the short run, al- 
though the long-run acceptance of the contracts, and indeed of the institu- 
tional structure of the CWB itself, depends critically on the ability of the 
agency to provide sufficient final payments to compensate producers for 
their initial losses on below-market sales of grain. 
Throughout, we confine attention to a domestic downstream firm that is 
legally allowed to establish vertical control of the upstream market through 
the contractual arrangement described above, while the foreign firm oper- 
ates under the auspices of an antitrust authority that does not allow the for- 
mation of procurement contracts. That is, the foreign firm is constrained to 
purchase inputs in the spot market at marginal cost c. 
Let Q represent industry output of the final good and denote the down- 
stream inverse demand function as P(Q), which is assumed throughout to 
be strictly decreasing and twice continuously differentiable. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that 
P'(Q) + QP"(Q) < O, (1) 
which ensures the existence of equilibrium and implies that outputs are stra- 
tegic substitutes.1? 
The model is solved using backward induction. Accordingly, the output 
stage is solved first, followed by the acceptance and contract stages, respec- 
tively. If the upstream firm accepts the contract proposed by the domestic 
10 William Novshek, On the Existence of Coumot Equilibrium, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 85 
(1985). 
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downstream firm, then the objective function of the downstream firm in the 
output stage is 
r i(q~, Q, a, w, F) = (1 - a)(P(Q) - w)q~ - F. (2) 
Maximizing (2) with respect to output yields the following necessary condi- 
tion: 
P(Q) + qlP'(Q) - w = 0. (3) 
The foreign firm's objective function in the output stage is 
7;(2, Q) = (P(Q) - c)q2, 
which is associated with the first-order condition 
P(Q) + q2P'(Q) - c = 0. (4) 
In the output stage, the level of output per firm and total industry output, 
which are denoted qi(w, c), where i = 1, 2, and Q(w, c), respectively, are 
obtained by solving (3) and (4). Totally differentiating these equations 
yields the ratio of comparative statics associated with the domestic firm's 
choice of w, 
3q2(w c)/3w 
_ 
P'(Q) + q2P"(Q) 
~qi(w, c)/cw 2P'(Q) + q2P"(Q) 
which is negative given (1). 
In the acceptance stage, the upstream firm is willing to accept the con- 
tract proposed by the domestic downstream firm provided it receives a pay- 
ment no less than its opportunity costs. Given that the upstream industry is 
perfectly competitive, these opportunity costs can be normalized to zero 
without loss of generality. As a result, the upstream firm accepts the con- 
tract proposed by the downstream firm whenever the following participation 
constraint is satisfied: 
(w - c)ql(w, c) + F + a[P(Q(w, c)) - w]qi(w, c) ' O. (6) 
In the contract stage, the downstream firm chooses the terms of the con- 
tract so as to maximixe profits in (2) subject to the participation constraint 
(6) and the output stage solutions above. Substituting the output stage solu- 
tions into (2) and (6), the contracting problem can be written as 
max 7el(w, a, F) = (1 - c)[P(Q(w, c)) - w]ql(w, c) - F 
w,a,F 
subject to 
(w - c)ql(w, c) + F + a[P(Q(w, c)) - w]ql(w, c) ' O. 
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Substitution of the constraint results in the following unconstrained 
problem: 
max7hi(w) = [P(Q(w, c)) - c]ql(w, c). (7) 
w 
Suppressing some of the output-stage solution notation, differentiation of 
(7) with respect to w gives the necessary condition for a profit-maximizing 
contract, 
(P(Q) - c) )q~(w, c) + qp,(oQ) Q(w, ' c) = 0. (8) 
aw aw 
Next, divide (8) through by [3(w, c)]/3w, substitute [3Q(w, c)]/3w = 
.i=l.2[Oqi(w, c)]/Ow, and then let aq2/aql(q2, Q) = [cqq2(w, c)/Ow]/[aql(w, 
c)/3w] denote the ratio of comparative statics given in (5). Making use of 
this expression, if q* and Q* represent he equilibrium levels of firm 2 out- 
put and industry output, respectively, then firm l's equilibrium level of out- 
put, q*, must satisfy 
P(Q*) - c + q*P'(Q*) 1 + 3^ (q* ,2*) = ? (9) 3ql 
Using expression (4), firm 2's equilibrium level of output satisfies 
P(Q*) - c + q*P'(Q*) = 0. (10) 
The equilibrium levels of output for the domestic and foreign firm are thus 
obtained by substituting Q* = q* + q* into (9) and (10) and solving these 
two equations simultaneously. 
To determine the equilibrium choice of w, denoted w*, the ouput solution 
(9) is substituted into (3), which obtains 
w* - c = 
-q* P'(Q*) 
~q2(q*, Q*) < 0, (11) aq\ 
where the inequality holds by (1) and (5). Thus, the optimal contract by the 
downstream firm specifies that the upstream firm sell inputs at a loss to the 
downstream firm. 
III. BACKWARD LINKAGES AND STRATEGIC TRADE 
This section examines two types of contractual relations: upstream verti- 
cal restraint and downstream equity sharing. Each form of vertical control 
is a special case of the above model. For the case of upstream vertical re- 
straint, the downstream firm compensates the input supplier for selling at a 
loss by paying a fixed transfer (that is, az = 0 and F > 0), while, for the 
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case of downstream equity sharing, compensation is made with a share of 
profits (that is, oc > 0 and F = O).11 
A. The Case of an Upstream Vertical Restraint 
In many nations, government marketing boards and private firms imple- 
ment various forms of upstream vertical restraint o directly orchestrate the 
pricing behavior of upstream suppliers. Such explicit control of prices in 
affiliated stages of production, whether implemented backward or forward, 
poses legal challenge in other nations. In the United States, for example, 
there are actually several related antitrust issues governing vertical relation- 
ships.12 Most directly, a claim may be made against the downstream firm 
for imposing a vertical restraint.13 In addition, if more than one downstream 
firm produces in a region of antitrust authority, both upstream and down- 
stream firms may be considered in violation of price discrimination law if 
the upstream firm does not charge identical prices in transactions with rival 
downstream producers.14 Even in the case of a single upstream firm and a 
single downstream firm, moreover, a vertical restraint is in violation of U.S. 
antitrust law if the contractual arrangement is deemed to create an entry 
barrier.15 
For the case of upstream vertical restraint, the downstream firm compen- 
sates the input supplier for selling at a loss in expression (11) through the 
11 Note that there are also many possible combinations of profit sharing and fixed transfers 
that the downstream firm can use to compensate the upstream firm for selling inputs at a loss 
to the downstream firm. For example, it is possible to combine these two forms of vertical 
control in various systems of "impure" equity sharing that involve both a fixed revenue 
transfer and a share of downstream profits. 
12 Jeffrey M. Perloff, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Paul Ruud, Antitrust Settlements and Trial 
Outcomes, 78 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 401 (1996), identifies 13 antitrust categories based on U.S. 
settlement and trial outcomes, several of which generally apply. 
13 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Group Life & Health 
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 
145 (1968). 
14 The U.S. courts have held downstream firms culpable for receiving the benefits of dis- 
criminatory prices in Federal Trade Commission v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); 
and Boise Cascade Corp., No. 9133 (F.T.C., November 1, 1990). In the case of vertical re- 
straints, a single firm contracting for a lower price with an upstream producer would not be 
considered to have the requisite anticompetitive effect on market power under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act unless there is also evidence of monopsony power in the industry. See Med- 
ical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, 518 F. 
Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982). 
15 See William P. Bivins Jr., Texaco v. Hasbrouck: The Supreme Court Reviews Func- 
tional Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, 36 Antitrust Bull. 413 (1991). 
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payment of a fixed transfer, F. If a is set equal to zero in the above model, 
then the participation constraint (6) implies that the optimal payment (that 
is, the minimum sufficient payment) is given by 
F* = (c- w*)q*. (12) 
Through use of (12), the downstream firm is thus able to use the upstream 
vertical restraint as a mechanism to create a credible output expansion in 
the final goods market by restructuring production costs between fixed and 
marginal cost components. The upstream price restraint, which stipulates a 
below-marginal-cost input price in the domestic upstream market, thereby 
precommits the domestic firm to an ex post beneficial output expansion in 
the downstream international market. 
B. The Case of Downstream Equity Sharing 
It is well known that vertical control can be arranged in various institu- 
tional forms. In conventional circumstances of retail vertical restraint (for 
example, resale price maintenance), a producer can solve various retail ex- 
ternality problems, often equivalently, through franchising and exclusive 
territories, through quantity forcing, and through direct integration of retail 
units. Similarly, the strategic advantage gained by employment of an up- 
stream vertical restraint, as outlined above, may be accomplished with a 
backward contract that relies on equity sharing in the downstream industry. 
As David Flath demonstrates, vertically related Coumot-Nash oligopolies 
produce a greater level of output when upstream firms own equity shares of 
downstream firms.16 However, linked equity interests violate antitrust law in 
certain nations. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against DuPont 
holding a stock interest in General Motors on the basis that DuPont's own- 
ership share allowed it to sell paint and fabric on grounds other than "com- 
petitive merit."17 Similar vertical antitrust laws regarding equity-sharing 
arrangements also exist among most E.U. members, while other nations 
such as Japan, Korea, China, and Brazil allow linked equity interests in ver- 
tically structured sectors.18 
Under a system of downstream equity sharing, the downstream firm com- 
pensates the upstream firm with a share of profits in the international mar- 
i6 Flath, supra note 2. 
17 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
'8 For a comparative assessment of U.S. and Japanese antitrust law, see Hiroshi Iyori & 
Akinori Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws and Policies of Japan (1994). 
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ket. Making the restriction F = 0 in the above model, the participation con- 
straint (6) implies that the minimum size of the equity share is equal to 
c -- w* 
a* = cw (13) 
P(Q*) - w* 
Substituting (3) and (11) into (13) results in the following: 
a* = q2(q,, Q*). (14) 
3ql 
Equations (1), (5), and (10) together ensure that a* lies between zero and 
one, which implies that the contract can be interpreted as a profit-sharing 
contract.'9 
The idea that equity sharing can be used as a strategic mechanism in a 
competitive upstream industry is related to the incentive for delegation 
within a single institution. As observed by Chaim Fershtman and Kenneth 
Judd, the owner of a firm has an incentive to distort his or her manager's 
incentives (for instance, toward sales instead of profit maximization) when- 
ever the reaction of the owner's competitors is beneficial.20 Our analysis re- 
veals a similar result here in the case of arm's-length transaction. A vertical 
contract that transfers a share of downstream equity to the upstream firm 
provides a method of precommitment hat is equivalent to that acquired 
through the use of an upstream price restraint. The use of vertical contracts 
to acquire strategic advantage, therefore, is quite robust to alternative meth- 
ods of compensation between upstream and downstream firms. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 
The control of upstream production decisions, either through upstream 
vertical restraint or through downstream equity sharing, results in an out- 
come similar to that acquired through direct government export promotion. 
However, unlike the case of export subsidization, in which the best re- 
sponse strategy of a foreign government is a countervailing subsidy, unilat- 
eral outcomes are maintained when vertical antitrust law is not sufficiently 
harmonized across nations or when certain nations employ government 
marketing agents while others do not. The enforcement of vertical antitrust 
l9 In a context of labor contracts, Bernard Bensaid & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Negotiation 
of Profit-Sharing Contracts in Industry, 35 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1069 (1991), derives a similar 
result for the symmetric case of n firms under conditions of linear demand. The derivation 
provided here is more general and can readily be extended to consider the symmetric n firm 
case. 
20 Fershtman & Judd, supra note 4. 
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laws within a nation, in fact, may provide the very mechanism by which 
firms in a rival nation are able to acquire and maintain strategic advantage 
in the international market. Irregularities between downstream firms in the 
ability to establish backward linkages can thus create asymmetry between 
nations in the balance of trade. 
Differences between nations in antitrust laws may also affect compara- 
tive advantage in vertically structured sectors. If downstream firms capital- 
ize on legal opportunities for upstream vertical control, then nations with 
lenient vertical antitrust laws may gain comparative advantage in the pro- 
duction of finished products. Conversely, a trade competitor with restric- 
tive vertical antitrust laws may have comparative advantage in the produc- 
tion of raw commodities and truncate the chain of vertical production at 
the upstream level. The source of comparative advantage in vertically 
structured sectors is an important policy concern for governments that wish 
to maintain domestic downstream industries and attract foreign investment 
in high-value-added stages of production. An implication of this paper is 
that enforcing restrictive vertical antitrust laws at the national level may be 
inconsistent with such objectives. 
Another implication of the model is that a uniform relaxation of antitrust 
laws across nations generates a procompetitive effect. When contractual re- 
lations are allowed to develop in both domestic and foreign nations, a non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium arises in which the formation of a vertical 
contract is a best-response strategy to contracting by a rival firm. Thus, ver- 
tical coordination is likely to occur multilaterally in environments with 
relaxed vertical antitrust legislation, even though such actions reduce ag- 
gregate profit in the downstream industry. In the present context, the pro- 
competitive effect of such multilateral contractual relations would lead to 
an enhancement of global welfare, as the formation of highly refined link- 
ages between firms expands global production, reduces the price of the final 
good, and thereby increases social surplus. 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The existing literature on strategic trade theory focuses primarily on the 
role of government intervention in redirecting firm-level behavior to 
welfare-improving trade equilibria. In this paper, we have explored a much 
different characterization of strategic trade in which the only role of a na- 
tion's regulator is to determine the legal boundaries that govern firm behav- 
ior through the establishment of national antitrust policy. 
The paper has demonstrated the ability of downstream firms or govern- 
ment marketing boards to employ backward linkages with affiliated up- 
stream producers to generate strategic advantage in export markets. Alter- 
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native systems of upstream price restraints and downstream equity sharing 
were shown to be consistent with profit maximization in each stage of pro- 
duction. In the context of nonharmonized vertical antitrust legislation, the 
paper has demonstrated that backward linkages improve the strategic posi- 
tion of firms that operate in nations without legal impediment to vertical 
control. Thus, antitrust laws, which have ironically been shown to decrease 
welfare in many different contexts, also adversely affect domestic profit- 
ability and reduce export volume in international markets.2' 
Future international trade negotiations are likely to focus on ways to fur- 
ther limit government intrusion in global markets. An important implication 
of the paper is that nations with restrictive vertical antitrust legislation have 
an incentive to establish greater harmonization of international laws. Verti- 
cal antitrust legislation is strategically disadvantageous to a nation in that it 
limits the establishment of backward linkages with upstream producers as 
precommitment mechanisms in export markets. 
Previous studies have suggested that, eventually, global trade may fall 
under a general set of harmonized competition policies.22 In order for this 
to occur, a greater understanding is needed about the importance of antitrust 
harmonization. The findings in this paper address these questions for the 
subset of antitrust law pertaining to vertically structured economic sectors. 
An implication of the paper is that nations with stringent regulations gov- 
erning vertical transactions have an incentive to negotiate for further har- 
monization of international antitrust laws. 
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